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Section 7 of the Charter and the
Common Law Rules of Evidence
Hamish Stewart*

I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1
coincided, roughly, with the Supreme Court of Canada’s revolution in
the common law of evidence. The Charter came into force in April 1982;
the common law evidence revolution arguably began the next month,
when the Supreme Court brusquely swept away the corroboration
requirement for the testimony of accomplices.2 It would, no doubt, be
possible to find links between these two developments, both doctrinally
and in terms of the legal culture of the past 25 years; in particular, the
boldness and creativity that the Court showed in the early Charter cases3
may well have influenced its approach to other areas of the law, including
the common law of evidence. But my interest here is in the more direct
relationship that has emerged between section 7 of the Charter and the
common law rules of evidence. The Court has on several occasions dealt
*
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. A draft of this paper was prepared for the National
Conference on the Charter and Criminal Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, September 29,
2007. I am very grateful to Michael Code and Thomas Cromwell for their comments on the draft,
and to Jamie Cameron and James Stribopoulos for the invitation to participate in the conference.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] S.C.J. No. 40, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 (S.C.C.). Another case from
the same year evincing a similar impatience with categorical rules is R. v. Graat, [1982] S.C.J. No. 102,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 819 (S.C.C.). Some might say that the evidence revolution began earlier, with Ares
v. Venner, [1970] S.C.J. No. 26, [1970] S.C.R. 608 (S.C.C.) (admitting hearsay evidence in the
absence of an existing common law or statutory exception) or later, with R. v. Khan, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) (same). On the revolution in the common law of evidence
generally, see John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in
Canada, 2d ed. Supplement (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004), Chapter 1.
3
See, for instance, the early cases adopting a generous and purposive approach to the
definition and limitation of Charter rights: Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation
and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); Reference re s. 94(2) of
the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor
Vehicle Reference”]; R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).

416

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

with the claim that a statutory change to the common law rules of evidence
is unconstitutional because the change is inconsistent with the principles
of fundamental justice. The Court’s response has usually been to reject
the claim and uphold the statute, but in doing so, to vindicate the values
underlying the common law rule in question, usually by an exercise in
statutory interpretation that preserves the trial judge’s discretionary power
to exclude evidence on the ground of excessive prejudice. Where this
interpretation is not possible, the statute is vulnerable to invalidation. In
cases where no formal constitutional issue arises, the Court has also
tended to reinforce its revolutionary changes to the common law rules of
evidence by intimating that they are consistent with, or perhaps even
required by, section 7 of the Charter.
This combination of constitutionally informed statutory interpretation
and common law development could, in principle, lead to the recognition
of a general right to the exclusion of patently unreliable evidence as a
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.4 But, for
a variety of doctrinal and pragmatic reasons, such a dramatic change to
the law of evidence is unlikely; it is more likely, and perhaps more
desirable, that the Supreme Court will continue to develop the existing
rules of evidence with a view to reducing the amount of unreliable
evidence that is put before triers of fact.5 Towards the end of this paper,
I argue that, along these lines, recent undesirable developments in the
common law confessions rule might be reversed if more attention was
paid to the norm that underlies the relationship between section 7 and
the common law rules of evidence: excessively prejudicial evidence is
inadmissible.

II. THE COMMON LAW OF EVIDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
1. Section 7: A Brief Overview
Section 7 of the Charter reads as follows:

4
Compare David M. Paciocco, Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987), at 335-91.
5
Compare Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim.
L.Q. 210.
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Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.

The approach to a section 7 claim in now well established. The
claimant must first show that there is state conduct that affects one of
the three protected interests — life, liberty or security of the person. The
claimant must then identify a principle of fundamental justice and show
that the way the state conduct affects his or her protected interest is not
in accordance with that principle. If the claimant succeeds in demonstrating
all of these elements, then he or she has established a violation of
section 7 of the Charter. If the violation is not authorized by any statute,
then it cannot be justified under section 1, and the claimant would be
entitled to a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. If a statute provides
a discretion, itself constitutionally valid, that engages the section 7 interests,
then section 7 requires the decision-maker to exercise the discretion
properly.6 If a statute violates section 7, then in principle the violation
might be justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on
the section 7 right. But the Supreme Court of Canada has never upheld a
section 7 violation under section 1.7 For the purposes of this paper, I will
assume that an evidentiary statute violating section 7 would not be upheld
under section 1. If not justified under section 1, the statute would be
declared of no force or effect pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982,8 and the claimant might also be entitled to a personal remedy
under section 24(1) of the Charter.
In criminal proceedings, section 7 is always applicable because the
liberty interest is always engaged: if found guilty, the accused may be
imprisoned.9 Thus, criminal proceedings always have to comply with the
principles of fundamental justice. But what are these principles? In
6
As in extradition and deportation proceedings; see, for instance, Suresh v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
7
On the high standard for upholding a s. 7 violation under s. 1, see Reference re s. 94(2)
of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 518 (S.C.C.). This high
standard has sometimes been interpreted as obviating the Oakes test except in extreme emergencies:
see, for instance, Cheskes v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2007] O.J. No. 3515, 87 O.R. (3d) 581,
at para. 138 (Ont. S.C.J.). There are some dissenting judgments that would have upheld a s. 7 violation
under s. 1; notably, in R. v. Hess, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.), McLachlin J.,
dissenting, would have upheld a clear violation of the “no liability without fault” principle.
8
Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
9
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 89 (S.C.C.);
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at
para. 18 (S.C.C.).
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the Motor Vehicle Reference,10 the Court rejected the argument that the
principles of fundamental justice should be equated with procedural
fairness or natural justice; while the principles of fundamental justice
certainly require procedural fairness, 11 they also include substantive
requirements.12 The early section 7 cases indicated, grandly if somewhat
vaguely, that the principles of fundamental justice were to be found in
“the basic tenets of our legal system”13 and, like sections 8 through 14 of
the Charter, were “essential elements of a system for the administration
of justice which is founded upon a belief in ‘the dignity and worth of the
human person’ … and on ‘the rule of law’”.14 More recently, the Court
has articulated a rather stringent three-part test for determining whether
a proposed legal principle or rule is a principle of fundamental justice
for section 7 purposes:
[F]or a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental justice
for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which there
is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which
the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be identified with
sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to
measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person. 15

So any assertion that a particular common law rule of evidence is a
principle of fundamental justice must now be tested against this standard.
A common law rule of evidence rule will typically satisfy the first and
third criteria; given that these rules are routinely applied by trial judges,
they are certainly legal principles that can be identified with sufficient
10
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
11
See, for example, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J.
No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
12
See, for example, R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.) (a law must not be vague); R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (the fault element of a criminal offence must be proportionate to the seriousness
of the offence); R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (a law must
not be overbroad in relation to its own purposes); Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005]
S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (a law must not be arbitrary).
13
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.).
14
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.), quoting from the preamble to the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C.
1970, App. III, and from the preamble to the Charter.
15
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 113 (S.C.C.);
see also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519,
at 590-91 (S.C.C.); R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.).
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precision. The question will be whether the rule is “fundamental to the
way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate”, and this in turn
will depend on how well the rule promotes the goals of the common law
trial process: the search for truth, fairness to the parties, efficiency, the
integrity of the administration of justice and other social values.16
2. Common Law Values in the Rules of Evidence
Section 7 is always engaged in criminal proceedings because the
accused always faces a possible deprivation of liberty. So the rules of
evidence, like any other aspect of the proceedings, must comply with
the principles of fundamental justice. The rules of evidence in Canada
remain largely a matter for development under the common law, subject
to certain statutory changes. But are any of the common law rules of
evidence principles of fundamental justice for the purposes of section 7
of the Charter? This issue has been addressed in a series of cases involving
statutory changes to the common law that have facilitated the prosecution
of offences, particularly sexual offences. In these cases, the Supreme
Court of Canada has generally rejected the argument that any particular
common law rule of evidence is a principle of fundamental justice, but
in so doing, the Court has in effect constitutionalized certain of the values
underlying the common law rules. The usual response to these section 7
challenges has been to interpret the statute as preserving some important
aspect of the common law and, with that interpretation in place, to reject
the challenge.
At common law, a trial judge has the power to exclude evidence
where, in the trial judge’s view, the prejudicial effect of the evidence
outweighs its probative value. 17 This power is sometimes called a
“discretion”, and it is discretionary in the limited sense that the trial
judge’s assessment of prejudicial effect and probative value is entitled to
considerable deference on appeal. But there is an important sense in which
the exercise of the power is not discretionary: if the trial judge concludes
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs the probative value,

16

This list of objectives is based on John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant,
The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. Supplement (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004), at 8-10.
17
For a review of the different formulations of this power, see R. v. Seaboyer, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 610-11 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J.
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he or she must exclude it.18 I will refer to this power as the “discretionary
exclusionary power”.
Rather than constitutionalizing any particular common law rule of
evidence, the Supreme Court of Canada has effectively constitutionalized
the discretionary exclusionary power by rejecting Charter challenges to
statutes while interpreting them as preserving the power. As Rosenberg
put it some years ago, “the courts have been remarkably resistant to
using the Charter to strike down evidentiary rules … [and] have found
that it is much more useful to uphold the existing rule, while giving to
the trial judge a greater discretion in applying the evidentiary rules.” 19
This process may be illustrated with reference to four cases decided
between 1988 and 1993.
Under section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act,20 any witness “may
be questioned as to whether the witness has been convicted of any
offence”. It is well established that section 12 applies to the accused as a
witness, if the accused chooses to testify at his or her own trial. In R. v.
Corbett,21 the accused argued that the application of section 12 to an
accused person infringed the right to a fair trial guaranteed by section
11(d) of the Charter.22 The Court rejected this argument, but only after
interpreting section 12 as preserving the discretionary exclusionary power.23
Indeed, Beetz J., speaking for himself, was clearly of the view that
section 12 would offend section 7 if it could not be read as incorporating
the discretion.24
In R. v. Potvin,25 the accused challenged what is now section 715 of
the Criminal Code.26 This section creates an exception to the rule against
hearsay for a transcript of a witness’s testimony from a previous proceeding
on the same charge where the witness “refuses to be sworn or to give
18
Compare R. v. Handy, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 164 C.C.C. (3d) 481
at para. 153 (S.C.C.).
19
Marc Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases”,
in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996)
181, at 191.
20
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
21
[1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.).
22
Thus R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) is not, strictly
speaking, a s. 7 case, but it is well established that the right to a fair trial is also a principle of
fundamental justice under s. 7.
23
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 729-40 (S.C.C.), per
La Forest J., dissenting on other grounds.
24
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 699 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J.
25
[1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.).
26
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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evidence” or can be shown to be dead, insane, too ill to testify or absent
from Canada, and where “the evidence was taken in the presence of the
accused”, unless “the accused did not have full opportunity to crossexamine the witness.” The accused Potvin, along with Deschênes and
another, were charged with murder. However, the Crown proceeded
against the accused separately, and called Deschênes as a witness at the
accused’s preliminary inquiry. The accused was committed for trial. At
trial, Deschênes refused to testify, and the Crown relied on section 715
to put his preliminary inquiry testimony before the jury. The accused
argued that it was a principle of fundamental justice that he should have
the opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses against him at trial;
accordingly, section 715 offended section 7. The Court rejected this
argument, holding instead that section 7 required that “the accused
have… a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the previous
testimony was taken if a transcript of such testimony is to be introduced
as evidence in a criminal trial for the purpose of convicting the accused”.27
But the court also interpreted section 715 as preserving the discretionary
exclusionary power;28 indeed, Wilson J. for the majority interpreted it as
providing an even broader exclusionary discretion.
In R. v. L. (D.O.),29 the Court considered a constitutional challenge to
section 715.1 of the Criminal Code,30 which provides for the admission
of a video recording of a statement of a young witness “made within a
reasonable time after the alleged offence” and describing the offence, if
the witness “adopts the contents” of the video recording while testifying.31
Such a video recording would probably not be admissible, absent the
statute. If offered for the truth of its contents, it would be hearsay, and if
it merely repeated the witness’s testimony, it would be a prior consistent
statement; it would therefore be admissible only under a common law
exception to one of these rules. The accused argued that the rule against
hearsay and the rule against the admission of prior consistent statements
were principles of fundamental justice and that section 715.1 was
27

R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 543 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 551-52, per Wilson J. and at 532,
per La Forest J. (S.C.C.).
29
[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.).
30
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
31
When R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.) was decided,
s. 715.1 was applicable only to complainants in sexual cases, and spoke of a “videotape”; it has
since been broadened to all witnesses who are under 18 at the time of the alleged offence and to all
forms of “video recording”. The words I have quoted in the text appear in both the former and the
current versions of the section.
28
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unconstitutional because it created exceptions to those rules. The Court
rejected these arguments.32 On the assumption that the section did create
the exceptions to the common law rules suggested by the accused,33 the
Court rejected the claim that these rules were principles of fundamental
justice; rather, the governing principle of fundamental justice was the
right to a fair trial. Section 715.1 did not infringe the right to a fair trial, in
particular because it was read as preserving the discretionary exclusionary
power.34
Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, in R. v. Seaboyer35 the Court
constitutionalized a version of the discretionary exclusionary power as it
applies to evidence led by the defence. A proper appreciation of the
significance of Seaboyer requires a brief explanation of the common law
background. At common law, the complainant in a sexual case could be
questioned about her sexual history, based on the assumption that an
unchaste woman was more likely to consent to sexual activity and less
likely to be truthful. While independent proof of the complainant’s sexual
history was limited by other rules of evidence,36 neither the complainant’s
testimony, nor the independent proof (to the extent that it was admissible)
concerning her sexual history would be excluded on the ground that its
prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value. Indeed, at common
law, there was good authority for the proposition that the discretionary

32
The lengthiest and most thoroughly reasoned judgment was delivered by L’HeureuxDubé J., Gonthier J. concurring. The majority judgment, delivered by Lamer C.J.C., La Forest,
Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci JJ. concurring, basically agrees with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s
analysis of the constitutional issues; it appears that the need for a separate concurring judgment was
due to the majority’s reluctance to accept everything that L’Heureux-Dubé J. had to say about the
policy objectives of s. 715.1. Justice Major, speaking for himself, was content to state that he
agreed with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s disposition of the constitutional questions. I will refer mainly to
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s reasons.
33
The Court expresses some doubt as to whether s. 715.1 creates an exception to the rule
against hearsay, but L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s explanation of why the video recording is not a prior
consistent statement clearly shows that the video recording is indeed hearsay: “The videotaped
evidence is the only evidence before the court with regard to the details of the child’s sexual abuse.
It is, in fact, the evidence itself, as if the child were giving it in open court or in lieu of open court
evidence.” (R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at 458 (S.C.C.), original
emphasis). The video recording cannot be “the evidence” against the accused unless it is accepted
for the truth of the events that the witness describes in the recording; consequently, a video
recording admitted under s. 715.1 is hearsay.
34
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at 461 (S.C.C.); compare at 429,
per Lamer C.J.C.
35
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).
36
See Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in Canadian Law (looseleaf) (Aurora, ON: Canada
Law Book, 2004), at §7:400.10.
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exclusionary power simply did not apply to evidence tendered by the
defence.37
In 1983, as part of a major reform of the sexual offences, Parliament
enacted a predecessor to what is now section 276 of the Criminal Code.38
This statute provided that evidence of the complainant’s sexual history
was admissible only in three narrow and well-defined situations. Two
accused persons, in separate proceedings, challenged section 276 of the
Criminal Code, arguing that its abrogation of the common law rules of
evidence infringed their section 7 right to make full answer and defence.
The Supreme Court of Canada, rejecting the assumptions underlying
the common law rules, was unanimously of the view that a trier of fact
could not legitimately base inferences about either consent or credibility
on evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activity; accordingly, to
the extent that section 276 excluded evidence that supported only those
inferences, it did not offend the Charter. But a majority of the Court, per
McLachlin J., agreed that section 276 was nonetheless unconstitutional.
First, McLachlin J. identified the following principle of fundamental
justice: “the prejudice must substantially outweigh the value of the evidence
before a judge can exclude evidence relevant to a defence allowed by
law.”39 This constitutional principle, though narrower than the common
law rule that the discretionary exclusionary power did not apply to defence
evidence, significantly limits the legislature’s power to modify the rules
of evidence in penal proceedings. Second, McLachlin J. outlined a number
of hypothetical situations in which section 276 would exclude evidence
of the complainant’s sexual activity even though that evidence could
support legitimate inferences and even though the prejudicial effect of
the evidence would not substantially outweigh its probative value with
respect to those inferences. Accordingly, section 276 was struck down.40
But, in striking section 276 down, the Court did not simply revive the
37

In the words of Martin J.A., “no discretion exists to exclude relevant evidence offered
by an accused on the ground that it is prejudicial to the Crown”: R. v. Valley, [1986] O.J. No. 77,
26 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 239 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1986] 1 S.C.R. xiii (S.C.C.); see
also R. v. Hawke, [1975] O.J. No. 2200, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 19, at 54-55 (Ont. C.A.).
38
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. For a discussion of an earlier version of the statutory prohibition
on questioning the complainant about her sexual history, see Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in
Canadian Law (looseleaf) (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2004), at §7:400.20.
39
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 611 (S.C.C.).
40
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, in one of her most famous dissents, held that s. 276 did not
exclude any evidence that could, in a decision-making atmosphere free of false stereotypes about
women’s behaviour, support legitimate inferences; consequently, she would have rejected the s. 7
challenge altogether.
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common law as it stood before the reforms of the 1970s; instead, it put
in place a new and very detailed common law rule governing the admission
of evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct.41
In my view, these four cases — R. v. Corbett,42 R. v. Potvin,43 R. v.
L. (D.O.)44 and R. v. Seaboyer45 — give constitutional status to the trial
judge’s discretionary exclusionary power. It is a principle of fundamental
justice that a trial judge must have the power to exclude evidence tendered
by the Crown where the prejudicial effect of that evidence outweighs its
probative value. While it is true that the Court has never expressly stated
that this rule is a principle of fundamental justice, in light of these cases,
there is little doubt that a statute that could not be interpreted so as to
respect it would violate section 7.46 Moreover, it is a recognized principle
of fundamental justice that a trial judge must have the power to admit
evidence tendered by the defence unless its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value. An evidentiary statute that limits or removes
this power in criminal proceedings (or any other proceedings where life,
liberty or security of the person is at stake) therefore infringes section 7.
Wherever possible, the Court will read statutes that modify the common
law rules of evidence as preserving the discretionary exclusionary power.
But there is a strong argument to be made that these principles of
fundamental justice were not, historically speaking, very deeply rooted
in the common law of Canada. In 1970, the Supreme Court of Canada
said that the discretionary exclusionary power extended only to “evidence
gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous,
and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the court
is trifling”.47 As late as 1989, only two years before R. v. Seaboyer,48
41

R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 634-36 (S.C.C.). When
Parliament enacted the current version of s. 276 — its third attempt to create a satisfactory limit on
the questioning of the complainant — it followed this new common law rule very closely. Unsurprisingly,
the new s. 276 survived constitutional challenge: see R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.).
43
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.).
44
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.).
45
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).
46
Compare Rollie Thompson, “Rounding Up the Usual Criminal Suspects, and a Few More
Civil Ones: Section 7 after Chaoulli” (2007) 20 N.J.C.L. 129, at 160. The constitutionalization of
the discretionary exclusionary power was anticipated by David M. Paciocco, Charter Principles
and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 430-32.
47
R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272, at 293 (S.C.C.); see also Marc
Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases”, in Jamie Cameron,
ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 181, at 181-83;
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a majority of the court seemed to think that the Wray formulation still
governed.49 And, on the other side of the coin, the discretion did not extend
to evidence tendered by the defence;50 evidence led by the accused was,
of course, subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, but those rules could
be relaxed in the accused’s favour.51 Moreover, although the Court’s
approach to the constitutional question in Seaboyer was deeply rooted in
the nature of the common law trial process, the remedy was not simply
to revive a discredited common law approach but to promulgate a
statute-like common law rule motivated by common law values.
Thus, while the Court is very reluctant to constitutionalize any
particular common law rule of evidence, even one as fundamental as the
rule against hearsay, it is quite willing to constitutionalize the values
underlying the rule. This willingness is most clearly seen in its
constitutionalization of the discretionary exclusionary power. The purposes
of this power are to protect the integrity of the common law trial process
from evidence that is so unreliable, inflammatory or otherwise unfair
that a party should not be required to respond to it, and to keep the trial
process focused on the real issues between the parties. By reading statutory
incursions on the common law rules of evidence as subject to the
discretionary exclusionary power, the Court protects these purposes
while giving Parliament considerable scope to amend the rules of evidence
to respond to deficiencies in the common law.
3. Intimations of Constitutionality
In cases where a statute is not in issue, the Court has not had to directly
face the question of whether the common law rules of evidence are
principles of fundamental justice; but the Court has often intimated that
some aspects of the common law support constitutionally guaranteed rights,
or vice versa. Most famously, the Court drew extensively on some aspects
David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at
33-34.
48
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).
49
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 552 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J.
(Lamer and Sopinka JJ. concurring). Justice La Forest, speaking for himself and Dickson C.J.C.,
rejected the Wray formulation but nonetheless described the discretionary exclusionary power in
stringent terms. He held (at 531) that s. 715 left “room for the operation of the ordinary principles
of the law of evidence, including the rule that the trial judge may exclude admissible evidence if its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value”.
50
See note 37.
51
Compare R. v. Williams, [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.).
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of the common law to recognize a constitutionally protected right to silence
under section 7 of the Charter.52 Moreover, the Court has on several
occasions expressly stated that some aspect of the common law rules of
evidence is consonant with section 7 values; as David Paciocco puts it in
his contribution to this conference, the Court has left “Charter tracks” on
the common law of evidence.53 In developing the principled approach to
hearsay in R. v. Khelawon, the Court has indicated that “difficulties in
testing the evidence, or conversely the inability to present reliable evidence,
may impact on an accused’s ability to make full answer and defence, a
right protected by s. 7”.54 In delineating the broad scope of the accused’s
right to cross-examine in R. v. Lyttle, the Court has stated that “the right
of an accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses … is an essential
component of the right to make a full answer and defence” which is
“protected by ss. 7 and 11(d)”.55 In reformulating the test for the
admissibility of similar fact evidence in R. v. Handy, the Court stated
that a “verdict … based on prejudice rather than proof … undermin[es]
the presumption of innocence enshrined in ss. 7 and 11(d)”.56 These last
three cases — R. v. Khelawon, R. v. Lyttle, and R. v. Handy — were all
unanimous decisions intended to clarify, in a principled way, various
difficult points of the common law of evidence. It is true that none of
them involved a constitutional challenge to a statute, so that the Court
was not required to decide the precise implications of the principles of
fundamental justice for the rule against hearsay, the right to cross-examine
or the admissibility of similar facts, but it is nonetheless striking that the
Court was prepared to intimate that its reformulation of the common law
rule in question might be required by the principles of fundamental justice.

52

R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.).
David Paciocco, “Charter Tracks: Twenty-Five Years of Constitutional Influence on the
Criminal Trial Process and Rules of Evidence”, in this volume.
54
R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
55
[2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at paras. 41 and 43 (S.C.C.).
56
R. v. Handy, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 164 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 139
(S.C.C.). Compare R. v. Terezakis, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1592, 223 C.C.C. (3d) 344, at paras. 45-46
(B.C.C.A.).
53
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III. UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
1. A Right against Unreliable Evidence?
An important theme runs through both types of cases discussed in the
previous section: the link between the accused’s right to a fair trial and
the trial judge’s role in excluding unreliable evidence. So it is tempting
to argue that Canadian courts should recognize a general section 7 Charter
right against the admission of patently unreliable evidence. It might
be argued that this right is implicit in the constitutionalization of the
discretionary exclusionary power, insofar as one type of prejudicial
effect is the concern that the trier of fact will give excessive weight to
unreliable evidence. Moreover, this right would be entirely consistent
with the intimations of constitutionality that have helped to inform the
development of the common law of evidence in the Charter era, notably
in R. v. Khelawon,57 where it was suggested that the exclusion of
unreliable evidence under the principled approach to hearsay might be
required by the section 7 right to a fair trial.
However, it has to be said that Canadian courts have not, so far, been
receptive to recognizing a right to the exclusion of unreliable evidence
as such. In R. v. Buric,58 the trial judge found that the proposed testimony
of a Crown witness had been tainted by the manner in which the police
had interviewed the witness, and excluded the evidence on the ground that
its admission would make the trial unfair. The accused were acquitted.
The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that the apparent
unreliability of the evidence was not a ground for excluding it; the issues
of credibility raised by the police interview could be explored in crossexamination. Justice Labrosse commented that “The admission of evidence
which may be unreliable does not per se render a trial unfair.”59 The
Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. In R. v. Osmar,60
the accused sought exclusion of his statement to an undercover police
officer in a “Mr. Big” scenario. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that
there was no Charter ground for exclusion61 and that, at common law,
57

[2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (S.C.C.).
[1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.).
59
R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at 750 (Ont. C.A.) (original emphasis),
affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
60
[2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.).
61
R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 25-47 (Ont. C.A.).
58
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such a statement could be excluded only in accordance with the fourth
branch of the confessions rule as articulated in R. v. Rothman,62 that is,
only if the conduct of the police in obtaining the statement would shock
the conscience.63 In R. v. Duguay,64 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
rejected the suggestion that a trial judge, in applying the discretionary
exclusionary power, should always consider the reliability or unreliability
of proposed Crown evidence. Although the Court noted that an assessment
of threshold reliability is now required for certain decisions about
admissibility, it held that this assessment should not apply generally to
all evidence, because of the dangers of usurping “the role of the jury in
our criminal justice system” and making “the voir dire process … more
onerous than the trial on the merits”.65 Strikingly, the facts of the case
involved the proposed testimony of a jailhouse informant; notwithstanding
the well-documented frailties of such evidence,66 the Court followed
R. v. Brooks67 and held that, in the circumstances, a Vetrovec warning
relating to the jailhouse informant would have been sufficient.68
There is much to be said for the view that requiring a showing of
threshold reliability as a precondition for the admission of every piece
of evidence would fundamentally change the nature of the trial process,
and not necessarily for the better: the gain in the quality of the information
put before the trier of fact might well be offset by the increased length

62

[1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 48-54 (Ont. C.A.).
64
[2007] N.B.J. No. 337 (N.B.C.A.).
65
R. v. Duguay, [2007] N.B.J. No. 337, at para. 56 (N.B.C.A.). Compare David M. Paciocco
& Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at 41, which the Court
quotes extensively.
66
See Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding
Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 210,
at 225-28.
67
R. v. Brooks, [2000] S.C.J. No. 12, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237 (S.C.C.).
68
R. v. Duguay, [2007] N.B.J. No. 337, at paras. 58-61 (N.B.C.A.). The accused was charged
with first degree murder and counselling the commission of another first degree murder. The theory
of the Crown was that the accused had killed one victim and had ordered the murder of the other.
The theory of the defence was that one Bernier was responsible for the killings. The case against
Duguay rested essentially on the testimony of his alleged accomplices, who had admitted their
involvement, and of Bernier, who denied any involvement in the deaths. The proposed jailhouse
informant would have testified that the accused tried to hire him to deliver a document which would
result in Bernier’s being silenced. The trial judge held that this evidence was so unreliable that it
was inadmissible. The accused was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, the Court of Appeal held
that the trial judge had erred in excluding the evidence on this ground, but nonetheless dismissed
the Crown’s appeal because the error could not have affected the verdict.
63

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER

429

and complexity of the process itself.69 But there is also much to be said
for the view that, where courts have repeatedly recognized that there are
systematic reasons why a certain kind of evidence is unreliable, the
common law should recognize those systematic reasons by requiring an
assessment of threshold reliability for that kind of evidence.70 Like the
principled approach to hearsay, this development would at least be
consistent with, if not required by, the constitutional fair trial right of
accused persons. In the next part of this paper, I suggest how the
common law confessions rule might be revisited along these lines.
2. The Confessions Rule Revisited
At common law, a statement by an accused person to a person not in
authority is admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception for party
admissions. But a statement to a person that the accused knows to be a
person in authority must be proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have
been voluntarily made before the Crown can use it against the accused
for any purpose. Until recently, the voluntariness requirement could be
stated as follows. To demonstrate voluntariness, the Crown had to negate,
beyond a reasonable doubt, three tainting factors. First, an inducement
— a threat or a promise — would make the statement involuntary and
inadmissible.71 Second, a statement that was not a product of the accused’s
“operating mind” would be considered involuntary and inadmissible.72
Third, notwithstanding the absence of an inducement and the presence
of an operating mind, a statement obtained under oppressive circumstances
would be involuntary and inadmissible.73 In addition to these three grounds
of involuntariness, the Supreme Court has recognized that a statement to
a person in authority, whether or not the accused knew that the person

69
Some might say we have already gone a long way down this road: see, for instance,
Michael Moldaver, “A Trial Judge’s Perspective on the Charter”, in Jamie Cameron, ed., The
Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 143.
70
Compare Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim.
L.Q. 210.
71
This classic branch of the voluntariness rule originates in Ibrahim v. The King, [1914]
A.C. 599 (P.C.).
72
R. v. Ward, [1979] S.C.J. No. 29, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); see also the rather
restrictive formulation of the operating mind requirement in R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69,
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 941-42 (S.C.C.).
73
R. v. Hobbins, [1982] S.C.J. No. 25, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 553 (S.C.C.).
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was in authority, may be excluded at common law if it is obtained by
means of a trick that would shock the conscience of Canadians.74
The confessions rule is as deeply rooted and as important to the
criminal trial process as any other common law rule of evidence, so it
might seem natural to hold that the confessions rule is a principle of
fundamental justice for section 7 purposes. But it has not been necessary
for the Supreme Court to take this step because there has rarely been
any legislative incursion on the common law rule. 75 Moreover, as
Iacobucci J. pointed out in R. v. Oickle, there are at least three important
structural differences between the common law confessions rule and an
argument for exclusion under the Charter:
First, the confessions rule has a broader scope than the Charter. For
example, the protections of s. 10 only apply on “arrest or detention”.
By contrast, the confessions rule applies whenever a person in authority
questions a suspect. Second, the Charter applies a different burden and
standard of proof from that under the confessions rule. Under the former,
the burden is on the accused to show, on a balance of probabilities,
a violation of constitutional rights. Under the latter, the burden is on
the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession
was voluntary. Finally, the remedies are different. The Charter excludes
evidence obtained in violation of its provisions under s. 24(2) only if
admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. … By contrast, a violation of the confessions rule always
warrants exclusion.76

74
This branch of the common law confessions rule originates in Lamer J.’s concurrence in
R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 656-57 (S.C.C.), and was said to be
part of the rule in R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 65-67 (S.C.C.),
and in R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 35 (S.C.C.).
75
But see R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.), where the
Court considered a section of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, that, in a particular context,
made an otherwise inadmissible statement admissible to impeach the accused’s credibility if he
chose to testify. To preserve the constitutionality of the section, the Court read the section as not
applying where the statement in question was involuntary.
76
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). Additional
questions about the relationship between the common law rule and the Charter would include the
following (see also R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 39 (S.C.C.)).
Would evidence derived from an involuntary statement be admissible, as at common law, or would
such evidence be treated as “derivative conscriptive evidence” (R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.)) under s. 24(2) of the Charter? Would the Charter version of the
confessions rule include the rule in R. v. St. Lawrence (1949), 93 C.C.C. 376 (Ont. H.C.J.), to the
effect that an involuntary confession is admissible to the extent that it is confirmed by physical
evidence? Compare R. v. Sweeney, [2000] O.J. No. 3534, 148 C.C.C. (3d) 247 (Ont. C.A.).
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These differences point to the difficulty of conceptualizing the
confessions rule under the Charter. Should the confessions rule, including
its rule of automatic exclusion, simply be imported wholesale into section
7,77 so that there would be no resort to section 24(2)? Should police
conduct that results in an involuntary statement be conceptualized as a
violation of the accused’s rights, leading to an argument for exclusion
under section 24(2)?78 Should the extension of the confessions rule to
include police conduct that shocks the community be incorporated into
section 7?
The Supreme Court has recently addressed some of these structural
questions in R. v. Singh.79 The majority held that in the particular context
where the accused is detained and knows he or she is speaking to a person
in authority, the common law confessions rule and the section 7 right to
silence are “functionally equivalent”, meaning that the same result, in
terms of the admissibility of the accused’s statement, will follow no
matter which inquiry the trial judge embarks upon.80 More specifically,
the majority held that where the accused was detained and the Crown can
establish voluntariness, the accused will be unable to establish a breach
of the right to silence, and that where the accused is able to establish a
breach of the right to silence, the Crown will be unable to establish
voluntariness.81 But the Court did not hold (at least not expressly) that an
involuntarily obtained statement is always a breach of the right to silence.
While the Court’s recognition of the confessions rule as, in some sense,
a principle of fundamental justice is welcome, recent developments in
this area of the law are not consistent with its constitutionalized status.
The content of the rule has been diluted to the point that it may permit
the admission of unreliable and unfairly obtained evidence. In particular,
the Court has refused to extend the protection of the confessions rule to
statements to persons not in authority even when the circumstances in
77
In my view, this is the effect of R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475
(S.C.C.); see also R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 931 (S.C.C.) (“While the
confession rule and the right to silence originate in the common law, as principles of fundamental
justice they have acquired constitutional status under s. 7 of the Charter”). But Iacobucci J.’s
comments in R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 30 (S.C.C.), indicate that
he did not regard these authorities as settling the issue.
78
This approach would not account for the “operating mind” branch of the confessions
rule, which requires no conduct at all by the police to render a confession involuntary.
79
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583 (S.C.C.).
80
But see note 76, raising issues that did not arise on the particular facts of R. v. Singh,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583 (S.C.C.).
81
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 8 (S.C.C.).
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which the statement was made cast serious doubt on the reliability of the
statement, and where the statement is given to a person in authority, the
Court appears to have weakened the traditional common law concept of
voluntariness.
As noted above, the trend in the cases that confront section 7 with
statutory changes to the common law of evidence is not to constitutionalize
any particular rule of evidence but to preserve the trial judge’s discretionary
exclusionary power. The reason for preserving that power is to protect
the accused’s right to a fair trial by preventing the Crown from leading
evidence that would operate unfairly against him. And the confessions
rule is at least in part motivated by the same concern: an involuntary
confession is likely to be unreliable. Since we know both that there are
many reasons why someone might confess falsely and that jurors find it
difficult to believe that anyone would confess falsely, the confessions
rule requires proof of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt before a
jury can hear an accused’s statement to a person in authority. In addition,
the confession rule is supported by the principle against self-incrimination,
the “the overarching principle” of our criminal process,82 and by the
concern that the accused be fairly treated when in police custody.
If the relevant principle of fundamental justice is not any particular
common law rule of evidence but the idea that a person should not have
to defend himself or herself against evidence that is unreliable or unfairly
obtained, then section 7 would support revisiting two aspects of the
confessions rule. First, the Court should reconsider its reluctance to
exclude statements to persons not in authority.83 The rule that a statement
by the accused to a person not in authority is admissible is a simple
application of the party admissions exception to the rule against hearsay.
The party admission exception is motivated not so much by the inherent
reliability of party admissions — there are all sorts of reasons why these
statements might be unreliable — but by the role of party admissions in
the adversarial system.84 The party against whom the statement is led
cannot complain that he or she lacks an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant; he or she is the declarant, and so can take the stand to explain,
or to deny having made, the out-of-court statement. So reliability seems
82

R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555, at 577 (S.C.C.); compare
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
83
Compare Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim.
L.Q. 210, at 232-34.
84
R. v. Evans, [1993] S.C.J. No. 115, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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not to be the issue when a trial judge is considering a party admission.
But even this rationale should yield where the statement is given in
circumstances that cast serious doubt on its reliability. The rigid
application of this rule has led to statements being admitted where the
accused was assaulted and threatened with death,85 unlawfully confined,86
or subject to intense pressure from a purported gang87 — conduct that,
if committed by a person in authority, would clearly make the statement
inadmissible. The accused can, of course, seek to demonstrate before the
trier of fact that the circumstances in which the statement was made
should lead them to disbelieve it, but we know that jurors find it difficult
to believe that a person would falsely confess, even under pressure, and
it is partly for this reason that statements to persons in authority are
inadmissible unless voluntary. The Court should recognize that sometimes
a statement to a person not in authority can be made in circumstances
that render it so unreliable as to be inadmissible.
This recognition, though, need not be as radical as requiring the
Crown to prove all statements by the accused to be voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rather, statements to persons not in authority should
be made subject to the discretionary exclusionary power, a principle of
evidence law that we already know to be a principle of fundamental
justice. So a confession to a person not in authority should be excluded
if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. A classic form of
prejudicial effect is the concern that the jury may give undue weight to a
particular kind of evidence; since we know that jurors tend to overvalue
confessions, they should not be admitted unless their probative value
outweighs that prejudicial effect.88 For example, a confession obtained
under threat of death has in most cases virtually no probative value
because anyone would comply with the threat rather than risk death by
maintaining his or her innocence, so almost any degree of prejudicial
effect, that is almost any likelihood that the jury would accept the
statement despite its unreliability, would outweigh its probative value.

85

R. v. Wells, [1998] S.C.J. No. 67, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 517 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.).
87
R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] S.C.J. No. 3, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.).
88
Compare R. v. Wells, [2003] B.C.J. No. 927, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 301, at para. 65 (B.C.C.A.)
and R. v. O’Connor, [2002] O.J. No. 4410, 170 C.C.C. (3d) 365, at paras. 47-51 (Ont. C.A.)
(excluding a statement, though not a confession to the offence charged, by an accused person to a
person not in authority on the ground that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value); but
contrast R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 52-53 (Ont. C.A.).
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Other circumstances might be less likely to produce an unreliable statement
and so would generate a smaller prejudicial effect.
Second, recognizing the connection between the section 7 fair trial
right and the common law confessions rule should lead the Court to
reconsider recent developments which threaten to seriously erode the
confessions rule. As noted above, the common law confessions rule
traditionally had three reasonably well-defined branches: a statement
could be rendered involuntary by an inducement, lack of an operating
mind or oppression. But R. v. Oickle, R. v. Spencer and R. v. Singh89 seem
to have significantly altered this approach, in both structure and content.
In Oickle, Iacobucci J. held that challenges to voluntariness should not
be categorized; instead, a trial judge should “strive to understand the
circumstances surrounding the confession and ask if it gives rise to a
reasonable doubt as to the confession’s voluntariness, taking into account
all the aspects of the rule”.90 The Court’s rejection of a pigeonholing
approach to voluntariness is consistent with the trend of the law of
evidence towards a principled approach. But other aspects of Oickle are
troubling. The Court introduced novel elements into the assessment of
voluntariness: the question of whether there was a quid pro quo for the
accused’s statement and the suggestion that what really mattered was
whether the accused’s will was “overborne”.91 These elements become
even more significant in Spencer and Singh. Spencer holds that, in contrast
to the traditional English position,92 the mere presence of an inducement
is not enough: “it is the strength of the inducement, having regard to the
particular individual and his or her circumstances, that is to be considered
in the overall contextual analysis”.93 Singh and Spencer appear to confirm,
in contrast to all precedent before Oickle, that the test for involuntariness
is not whether the statement is tainted by inducement, lack of operating
mind or oppression, but whether the accused’s will has been overborne.94
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In the case of a threat, for example, it is arguably not enough that the
threat induced the detainee to speak; rather, it seems that the effect of
the threat must be so powerful that the detainee’s will must have been
overborne.95 Oickle, Spencer and Singh were intended to put the
confessions rule on a principled rather than a categorical basis;96 however,
the result of these cases appears to be that the protections accorded by
the traditional concepts of voluntariness are weakened to the point where
unreliable confessions may well be admissible.
In light of these cases, it is quite possible that the police could make
an explicit promise or threat, and the accused could make a statement in
response, yet the statement could be found to be voluntary because the
accused’s will was not “overborne”: the accused chose to speak. The
very fact that would traditionally have made the statement inadmissible
would now indicate voluntariness. This approach would amount to a radical
departure from the insight underlying the common law confessions rule,
which was that a statement could be rendered unreliable by a wide variety
of motives to speak, and that the only motive likely to produce a reliable
statement was a genuine willingness, protected as far as possible from
extraneous motives, to speak. There are many circumstances other than
an “overborne will” that can prompt a suspect to speak to authorities: to
get bail, to avoid an apparent threat from the police, to mitigate what
appears to be a powerful prosecution case, to find favour with police
and prosecutors, to protect friends or family members. None of these
circumstances requires the will to be “overborne”; any of them could
prompt an unreliable statement. And unreliable evidence is prejudicial
evidence; it invites conclusions about guilt that rest on inadequate
foundations.
If it really is the case that Oickle,97 Spencer98 and Singh99 have replaced
the classic questions of whether the accused’s statement was tainted by
95
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inducement, lack of operating mind or oppression with the question of
whether the accused’s will was overborne, then there is a serious danger
that statements traditionally regarded as unreliable will now be admissible
under the confessions rule; that is, there is a serious danger that these
statements will be admitted even though their prejudicial effect outweighs
their probative value. And there is nothing in these cases to suggest that
the Court has rejected the common law’s long-standing reasons for thinking
that involuntarily obtained statements were unreliable;100 if anything, the
Court’s reference in Oickle to selected social scientific evidence concerning
false confessions reinforces rather than undermines those reasons.101
If the discretionary exclusionary power is a principle of fundamental
justice, to comply with section 7 of the Charter, the recent erosion of the
confessions rule in Oickle and Spencer should be reversed.

IV. CONCLUSION
The relationship between section 7 of the Charter and the common
law rules of evidence has been direct but subtle. The Supreme Court has
in general avoided constitutionalizing any particular common law rule
of evidence, but has worked hard to preserve, even to extend, the trial
judge’s discretionary exclusionary power — that is, the power to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence where its probative value is outweighed
(or, in the case of defence evidence, substantially outweighed) by its
prejudicial effect. It is clear that the Court regards the discretionary
exclusionary power as a principle of fundamental justice. Moreover, the
Court has on several occasions intimated that various aspects of its
revolution in the common law of evidence — the development of a
principled approach to a variety of formerly categorical decisions about
admissibility — accord with, or are even required by, the principles of
fundamental justice. In this paper, I have suggested that while it is unlikely
that the Court will subordinate the entire common law of evidence to the
discretionary exclusionary power, keeping the constitutional status of
the discretionary exclusionary power in mind might help to reverse the
recent erosion of the common law confessions rule.
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